Wireless sensor networks provide solutions to a range of monitoring problems. However, they introduce a new set of problems mainly due to small memories, weak processors, limited energy and small packet size. Thus only a very few conventional protocols can readily be used in sensor networks. This paper proposes efficient protocols to distribute keys in wireless sensor networks. This is achieved without the necessity of using traditional encryption. The proposed solution replicates the authentication server such that a group ofmalicious and colluding servers cannot compromise security or disrupt service. We show that the proposed multiple server authentication protocols will only have 0(n) complexity, where n is the number ofauthentication servers. The protocols use information from the sensor nodes and the servers to generate a new key, and do not solely rely on the sensor nodes to generate good random numbers. The scheme works well even when the base stations are untrusted The proposed protocols guarantee that the new key is fresh and that the communicating nodes use the same key
INTRODUCTION
When using symmetric key cryptography, if two entities sharing no previous secret want to communicate securely with each other, they generally do so with the assistance of a third party. In wireless sensor networks, the two entities are typically resource-constrained sensor nodes, and the third party is a resource-heavy base station. Typically, the base station provides an authentication service that distributes a secure session key to the sensor nodes. The base station is sometimes referred to as a trusted third party, since every client has to trust it by sharing a secret with it. Many applications using wireless sensor networks do not require encryption, but do require authenticated messages. However, key establishment protocols require encryption to safely transport a new session key between the nodes.
Another problem is that the security of a typical key distribution protocol depends on the assumption that the authentication server is trustworthy [1] . When wireless sensor networks are deployed in battlefields or developed to monitor homeland security, they have a likelihood of becoming the target of adversaries. In an open environment, an individual server may not be completely and permanently trustworthy. Several existing protocols [2] , [3] handle the shortcomings of untrusted servers. We show the existing protocols have 0(n2) complexity, and are therefore not suitable to a resource constrained environment.
In this paper we propose a number of protocols to address these problems. Our proposed multiple server authentication protocols will have 0(n) complexity in time and space, and 0(n) messages, where n is the number of authentication servers. The proposed schemes do not rely on the sensor nodes to generate cryptographically good pseudo-random numbers. The protocols use information from the sensor nodes and the servers to generate a new key, and do not require traditional encryption to transport the new session key. We will show that the sensor nodes can prove the new key is fresh. We will also demonstrate how key confirmation ensures the nodes are guaranteed to be using the same key.
RELATED WORK
A. Sensor Networks We refer to a sensor network as a heterogeneous system combining small, smart, cheap, and sensing devices with generalpurpose computing elements. Sensor network applications [4] include tracking bushfires, monitoring wildlife, conducting military surveillance, and monitoring public exposure to contaminants.
The sensor nodes are resource constrained. A typical sensor node is the Mica mote [5] . It Perrig et al. proposed a cryptography library using symmetric keys [7] . Much of the research on authentication and key establishment protocols has used a symmetric key cryptography library, since until recently it was believed asymmetric key algorithms were too heavy weight. Perrig et al. [7] has proposed an authentication and key establishment protocols using symmetric keys. Recent work has shown asymmetric keys can also be used [8] . Singh et al. [9] has proposed an efficient key establishment protocol using elliptic curves. However, little work has been done to examine the performance of these protocols in different sensor environments. Vogt provided a survey of current authentication mechanisms in wireless sensor networks [10] . It should be noted that none of the solutions described above handle authentication when the base station is compromised.
B. Security for the Base Station
A simple approach is to replicate the authentication services of the server so that any one of several servers can perform authentication. However, this approach reduces the level of security; if one server is compromised, security for every replicated server is compromised. SIA [11] addresses the issue of compromised nodes by using statistical techniques and interactive proofs, ensuring the aggregated result reported by the base station is a good approximation to the true value, even if a small number of sensor nodes and the aggregation node may have been compromised. However, the communication overhead between sensor nodes and the base station is high. Other works have shown that some of the statistical methods used are not resilient to a group of malicious sensor nodes, and the end user should be aware of which statistical methods are easily cheated [12] . Another way to protect results is to use a witness node mechanism [13] .
A different approach is to protect the base station location. Routing mechanisms to protect the location and disguise the identity of the base station have been proposed [14] .
To make a key distribution protocol work in an environment where sensor nodes do not trust an individual base station, an authentication scheme, which can be used with limited resources and can reduce the requirement for trusting servers, must be found. 3 . NOTATION AND ASSUMPTIONS This paper will use the following notation to describe security protocols and cryptographic operations: In protocols using a multiplicity of servers, we assume A and B do not trust any individual server.
SINGLE SERVER PROTOCOL
We investigated the available single server protocols in the hope of extending a protocol into a suitable key establishment protocol for wireless sensor networks. Boyd and Mathuria have surveyed the previous work on protocols for authentication and key establishment [15] . However, the way these protocols work and interact in the sensor environment has yet to be investigated. Of particular interest in this paper are the protocols using shared key cryptography.
Boyd and Mathuria have listed a total of twenty-two serverbased key establishment protocols [15] . In this study we have reduced the number of protocols to a more manageable level. Protocols requiring sensor nodes that store old messages to prevent replay attacks have been removed. If an optimized version of the protocol exists, it is looked at in preference to the older protocol. The requirement of a flexible protocol ruled out protocols relying on timestamps, since not all sensor environments are guaranteed to have secure time synchronization. Another requirement is to minimize the amount of communication. We removed any protocols requiring five or more messages, leaving us with protocols sending less than or equal to four messages.
From the remaining filtered protocols, the protocol with the most properties was the Boyd four-pass protocol. The Boyd four-pass protocol [1] was chosen over the other server-based protocols due to the key confirmation property. However, if key confirmation is not considered important, then another protocol such as Bellare-Rogaway [16] can be used.
The Boyd four-pass protocol provides key authentication, key freshness and key confirmation in four messages. The clients A and B exclusively share a secret (KAS and KBS respectively) with the trusted authentication server S. By The security of the new protocol relies upon the unforgeability property of the message authentication code. The security is slightly weakened because the location names are no longer verified from decrypting the message and MACs. When B and A receive their messages, the location names for B and A can only be verified from the message authentication codes. However, conventional security protocols err on the side of caution [17] . Most algorithms producing MACs are good enough, because the probability that the location names are not A and B is extremely low. The benefit to performance is considered to be worthwhile, at the cost of a minimal decrease in security.
This protocol will only need to be run once between A [13] .
If the server becomes compromised, the key KS may also become compromised. A simple solution to this is to use multiple servers to create the key, so that even if one or more servers become compromised it will not affect the security of KS.
LIMITATIONS IN USING MULTIPLE SERVERS
Boyd and Mathuria have produced a survey of the current key establishment protocols using multiple servers [15] . In their survey, two protocols were listed: Gong's multiple server protocol [2] , and the Chen-Gollmann-Mitchell protocol [3] . However, this survey did not take into account the unique problems of a sensor environment. The main goals of using multiple servers in a sensor network are:
. Even if one or more servers become unavailable, it may still be possible for the sensor nodes to establish a session key. * Even if one or more servers are untrustworthy, the sensor nodes may still be able to establish a good key. A feature of Gong's protocol is that the sensor nodes choose the keying material while the n servers act as key translation centres. This allows keying material from one sensor node to be made available to the other. To ensure that the correct key can be recovered (even if some servers become unavailable), the sensor nodes split up their secrets using a threshold scheme such as Shamir's scheme [20] . To prevent compromised servers from disrupting the protocol, the sensors form a cross-checksum for all the shares. The crosschecksums are a combination of a one-way hash of the shares.
The other multiple server protocol is the Chen et al. multiserver protocol. A feature of this protocol is that the servers, rather than the sensor nodes, choose the keying material. Both nodes employ a cross-checksum to decide which servers have given valid inputs.
The major problem with this protocol is the size of the messages. The messages sizes are of 0(n2), which is not desirable in a sensor network. Another problem with the protocols is that the size of the output of the one-way function will have to be reasonably large (otherwise a malicious server can quickly calculate the possible values of the shares). So for small values of n, the message sizes themselves will still be very large for a sensor network. The cross-checksums in Chen's protocol also have to be encrypted, which wasn't in Gong's protocol.
Another aspect of the multiple server protocols is the creation of the new session key. The sensor nodes retrieve the new key by using a secret sharing mechanism such as the one defined in [20] . The time complexity to compute n shares with t trusted sources is 0(nt). The time complexity to recover the key is 0(tlog2 t). Having such a scheme or similar scheme in a sensor node will consume more resources in an already resource-constrained environment.
The existing multiple server protocols are therefore not suited for a sensor network environment. An ideal solution with the desired characteristics requires new multiple server protocols.
PROPOSED MULTIPLE SERVER PROTOCOL
The multiple server authentication protocol we have developed is based on the concept of Protocol 1. This will maintain security characteristics similar to those of the centralized authentication protocol, as shown in Protocol 1. Due to the severe resource constraints that exist in sensor nodes, a multiple authentication server protocol should have low computational complexity.
In our attempt to create an efficient multiple server protocol, we specified n servers. The sensor node A sends the first message, A, B, NA, to each of the servers. Each server sends their message to both sensor nodes A and B. Sensor node B sends NB, the keying data, and the cross-checksums created by B [KlK,if valid, CCB(i) {EM otherwise (4) where EM is an error message; an example will be the value zero. There is a remote chance that a valid case may be zero. If the valid value is zero, the server should be considered a compromised server (even though it is not a malicious server). Node A will calculate CCA(i), and compare it with CCB(i 7. ANALYSIS Our Proposed Protocol 2 has a number of advantages, one of which is that the nodes do not need good random number generators to create the nonces. The nodes could even safely use a counter for their nonce values. Another advantage is that if a server or a number of servers are unavailable, the au-L thentication service itself still exists through the other servers.
The servers and the sensor nodes have different keys; even if one or more servers become compromised, the authentication service or the security of the system is not compromised. The proposed protocol only encrypts random information. If the encryption cipher uses an IV value (such as the one currently used in TinyOS [6] ) then we can use a constant IV value. However, the constant IV value chosen for our protocol must only be used to encrypt the random data and should never be used to encrypt other information. Also, a wide variation of different ciphers can safely be used.
Some In order to study the performance impacts of each of the multiple server protocols, we first define the following symbols. The size of location indicator is ao, the nonce size is a1, the key size is a2, the hash size is a3, and the number of servers is n. The following equations are used to define how many bytes are sent for each message: Mli = 2ao + al, M2i = 2ao + a + a2+ a3,M2'1 = ao + a2+ a3,M3 a1 + na2 + 2na3, M4 = (n + 1)a3, and M5 = a3. However, there are n messages of type MI, M2 and M2' sent.
COMPARISON
The computational complexity of the existing multiple server protocols is greater due to the fact that the key is constructed using a key sharing mechanism. This has two major drawbacks in a sensor network environment. The first is the amount of extra code (and therefore memory overhead) needed when creating the new key. The second is the additional computation (and therefore extra energy) required when creating the new key. If we were to use a threshold scheme such as Shamir's scheme [20] to recover the key, the computational complexity will be 0(tlog2 t). Whereas, our proposed protocols use a simple exclusive-or function (as describe in Equation (6)) to recover the key, having a computational complexity of only 0(n). Not only does this save on computational cost, but also has the added benefit of requiring less code than a full blown key sharing threshold scheme. Also, the existing multiple server protocols have message sizes of 0(n2), whereas our proposed protocols are of 0(n).
The disadvantage of not using a full blown key share threshold scheme, is that t servers can only calculate the new session key between A and B if they were the only servers involved in the protocol. However, for performance reasons we have not placed the same restriction on our proposed multiple server protocols.
A memory comparison for our application was performed in a TinyOS environment. We compared CBC-MAC using SkipJack and HMAC-MD5 on our application, as shown in Table 2 . The ROM memory is greater for HMAC-MD5 than it is for CBC-MAC. The amount of RAM used is less for HMAC-MD5. We have proposed a multiple server protocol for authentication in a wireless sensor environment. Most of our methodology can be used in other networks with low-end devices. With the removal of the requirement for the servers to know the keys between each of the sensor nodes, we have proposed a multiple server protocol where the message sizes are of 0(n). We have also shown how an entity authentication protocol can be transformed into a key establishment protocol.
The proposed protocols also have the added benefit of not solely relying on the sensor nodes to generate cryptographically sound pseudo-random numbers, but still using information from each of the sensors to generate the new key. We have shown our protocols are flexible enough for them to be used with most cryptographic primitives and in many environments.
A security and performance analysis was carried out to demonstrate the strength and limitations of our proposed protocols. The previous section shows that our proposed protocol has a smaller message size than the existing multiple server protocols. A memory comparison between HMAC and CBC-MAC shows different memory characteristics between the two cryptographic algorithms.
